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Individualism and Social Change
An Unexpected Theoretical Dilemma in Marxian
Analysis *
Vitantonio Gioia **
Marx (especially in his youth) develops an original analysis of individualism,
rooted in the structure of modern society. He criticizes on the one hand Hegel and
many representatives of the ‘Hegelian left’, on the other hand ‘vulgar material-
ism’ and Feuerbach. Nevertheless, it remains true that in Marxism (especially in
Second-International Marxism) ‘individualism’ was seen negatively and, conse-
quently, the individual and their activities were always pushed towards the back-
ground, in order to emphasize the relevance of collective factors (classes, state,
political parties, etc) for explainig social change.
The question is whether this outcome has its roots in Marxian analyses or it is
the result of a theoretical distortion by early Marxist orthodoxy, due to the lack of
knowledge of young Marx’s significant works: the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy
of Right was published in 1927, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844 and the German Ideology were published in full version in 1932 and the
Grundrisse were published in 1939-41.
However, to reclaim young Marx’s rich analysis of modern individualism seems
important in order to build a historically oriented analysis of individuals and of
their relations to society. This approach would let us move away from the prevail-
ing axiomatic approach of both mainstream economics—centered on homo œco-
nomicus and their selfish motives—and many representatives of contemporary
sociology, who aim at building universal explanations based on the hypothesis of
rational agents acting in a social environment inhabited by ‘isolated individuals’,
at the expense of the historical features of individual activities.
* I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions.
** University of Salento, Italy (vitantonio.gioia@ unisalento.it).
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas 8(2019), 16, p. 3:1–3:37. Peer-reviewed.
1. Introduction
It may seem paradoxical to focus on a ‘theoretical dilemma’ in Marxian analy-
sis with reference to the birth and the role of modern individualism in capitalist
society. In fact, Marx (especially in his youth) developed an original analysis of
individualism, rooted in the structure of modern society. He set himself in conti-
nuity with the reflections of the great thinkers of the Enlightenment (Rousseau,
Condorcet, Kant, etc.), while criticizing Hegel and many representatives of the
‘Hegelian left’. Nevertheless, it remains true that in the Marxist view the role
of the individual has always been pushed towards the background, in order to
emphasize the relevance of economic and collective factors (classes, state, po-
litical parties, etc.) for explaining social change. The question is whether this
theoretical outcome has its roots in Marxian analysis or whether it has been
the result of a theoretical distortion of Marxist orthodoxy.
The latter view seems partially confirmed by the fact that Marxist orthodoxy
was built on the basis of only part of Marx’s works: theCritique of Hegel’s Philos-
ophy of Right was published in 1927, the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844 and the German Ideology were published in their full version in 1932 and
the Grundrisse was published by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute of Moscow in
1939-41. So Marxist orthodoxy was built without the knowledge of the texts in
which Marx largely developed his reflection on modern individualism and its
role in capitalist society. But this approach raises two questions:
• if orthodox Marxists did not perceive the relevance of modern individu-
alism, it is likely because the Marxian works that they considered did not
place the same emphasis on this topic as the young Marx’s reflections;
• if this is the case, we have to explain these differences in Marx’s view,
with reference to individualism and its role in modern society.
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As we will see, the new model of individualism was a decisive factor in the
building of historical materialism. On August 11, 1844, Marx wrote to Feuer-
bach, pointing out that his writings concerning human nature and men’s in-
teractions were “certainly of greater weight than the whole of contemporary
German literature put together” (CW 3, p. 354)¹. According to Marx, Feuerbach
had overcome the metaphysical individualism of Max Stirner and Bruno Bauer:
“The unity of man with man, which is based on the real differences between
men, the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of ab-
straction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of society!” (CW 3, p.
354). And yet, because of his naturalistic vision, he had also produced an inad-
equate model of individualism: “the relation of man to nature is excluded from
history” (CW, 5, p. 55). Once again, the category of ‘man’, defined only with ref-
erence to man’s natural endowments, replaces the category of “real individual”,
concealing man’s social and historical roots. If “the real production of life ap-
pears as non-historical, […] the historical appears as something separated from
ordinary life, something extra-superterrestrial” (CW 5, p. 55). The fact is that:
“As far as Feuerbach is a materialist he does not deal with history, and as far as
he considers history he is not a materialist” (CW 5, p. 41).
According to Marx, the individual dimension can assume a paramount im-
portance, only under the conditions that the whole of individuals’ endowments
is conceived—beyond the common traits of human nature—within the interac-
tion between individuals and their historical environment. On this basis, we can
understand the relationships between individuals and productive forces (in the
context of a specific social organization), as something that strengthens human
faculties:
The appropriation of these forces is itself nothing more than the development of the
individual capacities corresponding to the material instruments of production. The ap-
propriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the devel-
opment of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves. (CW 5, p. 87)
The characteristics of modern individualism depend on its social embedding,
for the simple reason that the mental and moral structures of individuals, the
¹ In the following, Marx & Engels 1975-2005 will be abbreviated as CW followed by volume num-
ber, page(s).
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changing features of their needs, the patterns of their desires, the whole of their
activities are socially and historically determined (Dewey 1999, p. 40).
In this perspective, a mechanistic vision of the relationship between the pro-
ductive system and individual behavior is distant from Marx’s conception. In-
dividuals’ choices and activities are determined by the awareness about their
social conditions, giving rise to collective orientations capable to induce so-
cial changes. The social transformations retroact on the individuals, modifying
their perception, culture and needs, giving rise to new problems and asking
for new solutions. As a consequence, in the young Marx’s view automatisms—
determined by the social position of the individual (according to the approach
of vulgar materialism)—are not contemplated, nor is the efficacy of individual
activity considered (as in the idealistic view) as separated from the conscious
perception of its material condition of existence. Social changes are the result
of collective activities, but collective activities cannot be adequately explained
without reference to individual behavior: individuals with their motives, their
awareness, their capability to solve problems in innovative ways (individuals
as “agencies of deviation”, according to Dewey’s definition of impulse; Dewey
2008, p. 67), overcoming the routine and the passive attitude, suggested by the
dominant ideology: “Individuals have always proceeded from themselves, but
of course from themselves within their given historical conditions and relations,
not from the ‘pure’ individual in the sense of the ideologists” (CW 5, p. 78).
As we will see, the rich analytical perspectives linked to this original model
of individualism of the young Marx shift into the background when Marx re-
flects about the economy as “anatomy” of capitalist society, disappearing almost
completely into the Marxist tradition, exclusively interested in the focusing on
the economic conditions making possible the transition from capitalism to so-
cialism. In other words, the theoretical pathway toward the construction of an
individualism characterized by a social dimension, because of the propensity
of the individual for social change, has been neglected. As a consequence, the
theoretical (and practical) horizon has been completely filled by the liberal (and
neo-liberal) model of individualism, which emphasizes the features of a rapa-
cious and a-social individual, determined solely by the pursuit of personal ad-
vantages within a context of unbridled social Darwinism.
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This paper will focus on the following aspects:
• the originality of the category of individualism of the young Marx and
its role in the making of historical materialism;
• the gradual loss of importance of this category in the work of the mature
Marx, because of his growing emphasis on the theoretical centrality of
‘economic mechanism’, in order to forecast the ‘necessary’ evolution of
the capitalistic economy;
• the consolidation of this view in Marxism of the Second International,
with reference to the issue of the transition from capitalism to socialism;
• the recovery of the young Marx’s approach in Antonio Gramsci’ analysis;
• finally, we will hint at the current relevance of Marxian reflections and
this model of individualism for contemporary social sciences.
2. Human nature, individualism and history in the young
Marx
Of course, I do not want to reconstruct Marx’s ample and rich reflection on
human nature. The purpose of this paper is much more limited: to emphasize
those aspects of Marx’s analysis of human nature which stress the individual’s
capacity for social change. At the same time, I will inquire into the reasons
leading Marx to push towards the background the reflections that were central
to his youthful work. Schaff was right when he wrote that the young Marx’s
anthropological analysis was a genetic element essential to the definition of
historical materialism: “it is historically true that in Marxism the category of
the human person was not deduced by the presuppositions of historical mate-
rialism, but, on the contrary, that the starting point of Marx’s sociology was
the problem of the individual” (Schaff 1966, p. 73, see also p. 79; my transl.). Of
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course, it is quite ingenuous to believe—as Schaff does—that historical materi-
alism can keep its genetic footprint apart from every analytical development or
every scientific purpose pursued (Schaff 1966, p. 39).
Marx, in his analysis of modern individualism, reflects at the same time on its
contradictory features and on the different interpretations of it present in the
contemporary literature. In fact, the explanations proposed on the one hand
seemed contradictory, on the other they were characterized by a common epis-
temological approach: they isolated one motive of individual behavior, trying
to interpret it as a universal and unchangeable feature of modern individual-
ism. On the one hand, Hegel had emphasized the individual as “consciousness”,
becoming “self-consciousness” through history (CW 3, p. 331 ff.), Max Stirner
theorized the individual as ‘Unique’, radically irreducible to the social order, and
the “hegemony of the spirit in history” (CW 5, p. 62, p. 144 ff.), Bruno Bauer saw
the individual as ‘consciousness’ on the basis of their religiousness (CW 5, p.
97 ff.; CW 3, p. 157 ff.), and Feuerbach, abstracting from historical processes, in
order to explain “the religious sentiment by itself”, presupposed “an abstract—
isolated—human individual” who is naturalistically determined (CW 5, Th. 6, p.
4; p. 37, p. 41). On the other hand, Enlightenment materialism (above all in the
French version) isolated the material character of man, emphasizing man’s uni-
vocal dependence on the natural environment (CW 5, p. 409 ff.; see: Badaloni
1976, esp. p. 62 ff.) and political economy, indicating egoism as a prevalent as-
pect of the individual, tried to link the dynamics of their needs with a pecu-
liar social type (capitalism): individual and society were seen as a result of a
‘natural evolution’ (CW 3, p. 217-21, see also CW 3, p. 164-67). Of course, the
question was neither the search for a common trait characterizing the category
of individualism, or the existence of those features inquired into. According to
Marx, focusing on a minimum common denominator was to be considered a
legitimate scientific operation, the question was: how this common trait of the
nature of individual was acquired and whether it allowed a sound analysis of
individual behavior and its changing aspects in history.
From this vantage point, we see in Marx’s view a significant epistemological
passage, which we find already, within the Scottish Enlightenment, in Hume
and Smith. According to Hume, in order to overcome the metaphysical founda-
tion of the reflection about ourselves, we have to leave that “tedious lingering
method” that traditional philosophy had hitherto followed, aimed at the devel-
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opment of particular inquiries about individuals and their relationship with the
world. In fact, such inquiries were developed on the basis of an unquestioned
view of the world and they were directed more towards the confirmation of that
general (and a priori) view, than to the discovery of the features of the individ-
ual. But Hume added, if we really want to analyze individuals and their behav-
ior, we have to start directly from “human nature itself” (Hume 2007 [1739], p.
4). This would also contribute to overcome the old metaphysical view of the
world.
For Marx also, the analysis of the individual, through their common traits
and changing characteristics, is a key for focusing on the social structures and
their historical evolution. So, Marx’s preliminary reflections about the natural
dimension of individuals does not represent a residue of an old philosophical
tradition, but an original approach to the reading of economic and social trans-
formations. The inquiry into the Gattungswesen (the essence according to the
genus) is the way to focus on the natural endowments that make history and
historical change possible, by means of human propensity to act (praxis), mod-
ifying the natural environment in order to satisfy their needs (CW 3, p. 276-77,
333; on this, see: Dumont 1977, p. 139-40; Pezzano 2012, p. 9 ff.; Basso 2008, p. 38
ff.). These endowments belong specifically to the human species, differentiating
it from other animal species, characterized by a passive and adaptive behavior
with respect to the natural environment:
The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It does not distinguish itself from it.
It is its life activity. Man […] has conscious life activity. It is not a determination with
which he directly merges. Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from
animal life activity. (CW 3, p. 276; see also: CW 5, p. 31)
According to Marx, we cannot avoid considering ‘man’ as a natural being, as
a starting point for every inquiry about man and society:
Man is directly a natural being. As a natural being and as a living natural being he is on
the one hand endowed with natural powers, vital powers—he is an active natural being.
These forces exist in him as tendencies and abilities—as instincts. On the other hand, as
a natural, corporeal, sensuous, objective being he is a suffering, conditioned and limited
creature, like animals and plants. That is to say, the objects of his instincts exist outside
him, as objects independent of him; yet these objects are objects that he needs—essential
Individualism and Social Change 3 : 7
objects, indispensable to the manifestation and confirmation of his essential powers.
(CW 3, p. 336)
Given these natural propensities, the life of the individual implies immedi-
ately a lot of practical activities and complex relationships with the environ-
ment. Cooperation and development of communitarian links are strategic in
order to satisfy present and future needs, following human projects and con-
scious activities: “man’s consciousness of the necessity of associating with the
individuals around him [is] the beginning of the consciousness that he is living
in society at all” (CW 5, p. 44). It is then not contradictory to say that “history
is the true natural history of man” (CW 3, p. 337), since man, exploiting the fea-
tures of his “nature”, transcends his “animal dimension”, characterizing himself
as an eminently historic being, who builds his own personality by acting in
historically determined environments. Individual personality and its evolution
are, then, linked to the consciousness of “real, active men”: “Consciousness can
never be anything else than conscious being, and the being of men is their ac-
tual life-process” (CW 5, p. 36). This consciousness implies, at the same time,
the building of views about the world, determined by every particular stage of
social development. The personality has not only a ‘social character’, but also
the changing character of a process; it is not the product of supra-human forces,
but that of a social man, a ‘self-creation’:
The conditions under which individuals have intercourse with each other […] are con-
ditions appertaining to their individuality, in no way external to them; conditions under
which alone these definite individuals, living under definite relations, can produce their
material life and what is connected with it, are thus the conditions of their self-activity
and are produced by this self-activity. (CW 5, p. 82; on this, see: Cimatti 2011b, p. 101;
Pezzano 2012, p. 9 ff.)
The critique of essentialism addressed to Marx with reference to this issue
is quite surprising. In fact, whether by essentialism we mean that the ordinary
world is a sort of appearance or manifestation of something intrinsic to it, con-
ceived as a hidden cause, it is clear that Marx’s Gattungswesen (or, in general,
his view on “human nature”) does not have these characteristics. The general
proposition that man (as natural being) is part of a natural environment, which
he can modify, because of his propensity to act in a creative way (praxis), is
3 : 8 Vitantonio Gioia
not an explanation. It is, if anything, a propaedeutic pathway to the building
of scientific explanations. The fact is that essentialism is often used in a gen-
eral and uncritical way with reference to every attitude aiming at the inquiry
into aspects or issues that are outside the formal contexts of ordinary scientific
representations. Nevertheless, scientific systems are not the world, but mental
structures built (Adam Smith would say: by our ‘imaginary machine’, see fur-
ther) for its explanation. There will always be an external reality to know and,
on the other hand, there is no phenomenon or relationship between phenom-
ena, even the simplest one, that expresses a theory by itself. Theories always
imply human activities and ingenious capabilities able to insert the empiri-
cal phenomena in our scientific systems in a correct procedural way. Frankly
speaking, I find amazing the attempt to consider this reference to human na-
ture as a form of essentialism. If it were so, as Popper himself pointed out, it
would be an acceptable form of essentialism, since science has to be “capable of
real discoveries”, overcoming the empirical aspects of the observed phenomena:
in “discovering new worlds our intellect triumphs over our sense experience”
(Popper 1962, p. 117). From this point of view, the convergent preoccupation
between moral philosophers and social scientists with reference to the human
nature category is significant. Moral philosophers aim generally at controlling
and bending the impulses and instincts linked to the category of human nature
in order to conform individual behavior to the prevalent rules of the processes
of civilization; social analysts tend to consider the concept of human nature as
irreconcilable and, even, dangerous for the formal structures of our scientific
reasoning and for the principle of rationality at the basis of the human behav-
ior which they adopt. Anyway, moral philosophers and social analysts do not
consider the possibility that in those inner forces of man and in his “natural
and vital powers”, developing in historical environments, it would be possible
to find a leverage for social change.
Besides, the charge of ‘essentialism’ addressed to Marx neglects that his epis-
temological view was explicitly critical of those who considered, through un-
founded abstraction, the human being as an ‘essential reality’ (as a spiritual
being) capable of creating history while preserving invariant features. The per-
sonality of individuals, materialistically determined, has a historical character
which depends on the social contexts within which they live. Culture and ideas
about the world are built in the interaction between individuals and between in-
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dividuals and nature. Of course, according to Marx, society is not uniform in its
morphological traits: social organizations change and in the course of history
become different historical types, endowed with original distinctive character-
istics. The explanation of individual personality has to be, therefore, sought with
reference to these different historical contexts. Consciousness is nothing else
than awareness about the “existence of men” about “their actual life-process”.
History cannot be reduced into “self-consciousness as spirit of the spirit”, be-
cause it is at each stage
a material result, a sum of productive forces, a historically created relation to nature
and of individuals to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its
predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and circumstances, which on the
one hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for
it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows
that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances. (CW 5, p. 54)
This reference to the natural propensities of man (Gattungswesen), however,
has a decisive importance in Marx’s analysis. From a certain point of view, it
can be said that Marx applied to social analysis and to the individual-society
relationship that sense of the ‘limit’ that Kant used in his theory of knowl-
edge. As Kant tried to avoid the propensity of reason “to overstep the limits
of [possible] experience” (Kant 1900, p. 74; 143-146), so Marx, with reference
to the natural propensity of man, defines a possible process of social change
depending on the relationships between two polarities: human awareness (and
activities) and the material conditions of existence, rooted in fundamental bio-
logical aptitudes appertaining to the human species. Of course, if the distinctive
characteristics of the historical processes and their scientific explanations have
to be searched for in the circular interaction of these two polarities, this does
not imply the complete annihilation of the ‘natural propensities’ of individu-
als. The Gattungswesen forms a sort of genetic basis for the ‘necessary social
relationships’, but it is not reducible to them. Natural endowments (vital and
natural forces, human creativity, etc.) can be reinforced or hindered by ‘social
relationships’, but they are not created by them. It is the reason justifying the
irreducibility of individuals to society, even though individual development is
the result of the historical determinations of the social organization.
The inversion of individual and society (interpreting individual as a univo-
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cal and total product of society), is—if anything—a result of those ideological
views, in which the material conditions and historical circumstances “appear
upside-down as in a camera obscura”; this phenomenon “arises just as much
from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does
from their physical life-process” (CW 5, p. 36). As a consequence, if the idea of
‘human nature’ that goes unchanged through history, even determining it, is
not conceivable; the idea that a human being can be mechanically and totally
determined by the social environment is equally inconceivable. It is a view that
Marx continues to emphasize, recalling it in the Capital: we “have to deal with
human nature in general, and then with human nature as historically modified
in each epoch” (Marx 1976, p. 759 fn.).
In this sense, we can also refute the “obstinate old legend” about the anti-
individualism and about the organicist view of Marx (Geras 2016, p. 11; Basso
2008, p. 9 ff.). Such interpretations are derived, inter alia, by a superficial reading
of the 6þThesis on Feuerbach: “human essence is no abstraction inherent in each
single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations”. Now, if
we isolate this sentence from the wide reflection about the human nature and
the Gattungswesen, we would reach paradoxical conclusions radically incom-
patible with the thought of Marx. If we assume the idea of a complete deriva-
tion of individual features from the social environment, the category of human
praxis becomes inconsistent with the work of the young-Marx. It would also be
difficult to understand the critiques that Marx addressed against the univocal
environment-individuals relationships of vulgar materialism or to explain the
whole of Marxian analysis about the role of ideologies: if the motives of human
action were completely attributable to the characteristics of the social system,
all of human activities would be immediately clear and transparent, because
men could not escape behavioral canons which are merely adaptive in nature
(it is the way adopted by economics). Furthermore, the inquiry into “human
nature” would simply be pleonastic. It would have been sufficient to start from
the features of social systems, given the coincidence between the characteristics
of the society and the constitutive traits of the individuals. The contradiction
would be even more relevant if we consider Marx’s intention to represent hu-
man activity as an activity aimed at changing social relationships, when they
were perceived as a limit for further human development. The hypothesis of the
dominion of society over individuals would eliminate any possibility of social
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change. In fact, given the tendency of social systems (and of the many sub-
systems that characterize them) to preserve themselves, and given the power
over individuals of the economic and social mechanisms, the coincidence be-
tween individual motives and the reproductive exigencies of the social system
excludes a priori social change. The sole possibility of change would seem to
be related to the Hegelian “law of the transformation of quantity into quality
and vice versa”, which Engels in the Dialectics of Nature (CW 25, p. 357 ff.) con-
sidered central in scientific materialism. It seems rather difficult however to
attribute such a vision to Marx.
3. Marx and classical economics: from human nature to the
“anatomy” of modern society
Given this rich reflection on human nature and individuality, we have to ask
whether the subsequent marginalization of the issue of the individual and its
development as a condition of social change in Marxism has to be attributed to
the analytic distortions of orthodox thought or whether its basis can be found in
the reflections of K. Marx after 1845-46. In fact, while it is true that the youth-
ful work of Marx was not known at the time of the spread of Marxism and
Socialism, it is also true that if such an issue had had the same relevance in
the work of his maturity, this would not have escaped his interpreters. In my
opinion, the large and engaging confrontation with classical economics has had
a decisive effect on this specific aspect, determining a sort of epistemological
shift that partially changed the Marxian object of research. Of course, this did
not modify the anthropological orientation of Marx’s approach and his interest
in human emancipation, but the economic factors and their internal relation-
ships assumed the role before played by individual and human nature from
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the epistemological point of view. The sign of these different theoretical per-
spectives can be found in Marx’s judgments on the analyses of Adam Smith
and David Ricardo. As is well known, Smith and Ricardo defined the object of
research (modern capitalism), isolating the distinctive features of the new eco-
nomic system and its original working mechanisms. Obviously, on this basis
their analyses can be critically compared (Dobb 1975, p. 324-335), focusing on
the logical contradictions of their scientific systems. Of course, this is only one
side of a possible comparison, the other being the basis of the different epis-
temological perspectives they adopted, which we want to emphasize for the
purposes of this paper.
As is well known, Marx often manifests surprise (and, sometimes, a certain
impatience) with reference to the fact that Smith seemed to move “with great
naïveté in a perpetual contradic- tion” (CW 31, p. 390), emphasizing the dif-
ference between an esoteric vision and a exoteric one, between his capability
to focus on “the intrinsic connection existing between economic categories or
the obscure structure of the bourgeois economic system” and his loitering on
the representation of the apparent and deceptive dynamics of economic phe-
nomena (CW 31, p. 390). Finally, Marx points out, Ricardo “steps in and calls
to science: Halt!”, isolating the “the starting-point for the physiology of the
bourgeois system”. He, focusing on the “determination of value by labour time”,
grasps the “contradiction between the apparent and the actual movement of the
system” and he builds (or tries to) a consistent scientific system (CW 31, 2, p.
390-91). Ricardo, the “scientific deficiencies of his procedure” (CW 31, p. 392)
notwithstanding, represents for Marx the most advanced analysis of modern
capitalism, imposing his system as a general point of reference. Marx does not
find relevant that the object of research, ‘the capitalist economy’, is built on the
basis of a different epistemological approach compared to Smith and that this
could imply—at least partially—different analytical purposes. In particular, the
‘economic order’ of Adam Smith was far away from that of Ricardo concern-
ing a specific aspect: the relationship between the mechanism of the economic
order, according to its distinctive features, and the effects on it of individual be-
haviors. In Smith’s opinion, the representation of a ‘whole’, through a scientific
system based on the use of inductive-deductive procedures (Gioia 2019), did not
imply that it actually function as predicted by the theory or that the behavior
of the agents were necessarily those envisaged by the (assumed) mechanisms
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of the economic system. This depends on two aspects: the way in which Smith
saw the relationships between his scientific system and the investigated reality,
and his belief that the autonomy of individuals and their free choices could pro-
duce unforeseen effects on the economy and society. As is well known, Smith
assigned a central role to scientific representation, because without it the ex-
planation of the facts and their causal connections would have been impossible.
Nevertheless, according to Smith, we have to be aware that:
1
we cannot derive the scientific explanations from the simple collection of
facts, but, at the same time, our theoretical representations cannot exhibit
the structure of the world (Smith 1980 [1795], p. 45 ff.; Berlanda 1984, p. 20 ff.);
2
our scientific imagination (the “imaginary machine”) allows representations
of the world viable for adequate explanations of the “real chains” we observe,
through appropriate analytical and procedural devices (Smith 1980 [1795], 66-
67, 105);
3
these explanations represent our knowledge of the relations between facts,
on the basis of a unified image of the whole, built by the social analyst
with reference to the distinctive features of the investigated world; such knowl-
edge can change if new facts and new causal relationships show its inadequacy
(Raphael-Skinner 1980, p. 20-21, Whightman 1975, esp. p. 50-52).
Of course, as for economy and society, the facts to explain are the behaviors
of individuals and the results of their activities within the context of a sys-
tem endowed with original features. Such a system supposes the prevalence of
some categories of behaviors and its ability to orient (by means of endogenous
mechanisms, institutional arrangements, cultural traditions, etc.) individual be-
haviors in accordance with its exigencies of preservation and development. The
fact remains, the dynamics of the system depends not only on the automatisms
of its internal mechanism, but also on the behaviors of individuals. Ex ante we
cannot decide which will be the real dynamics of the system, for the simple rea-
son that individual behaviors are determined by a larger variety of motives than
those supposed by social analysts, and some of them might not be completely
compatible with the logic of the system.
Philosophers use to think that individuals behave in the way envisaged by
the logic of their theoretical system, but this belief is unrealistic and based on
erroneous analyses about the motives of individuals. In fact, Smith points out,
“traditional philosophy” can insist on the necessary convergence between in-
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dividual behaviors and exigencies of the economic (and social) system, because
of the procedure adopted for establishing the motives of individuals. They nor-
mally start by aprioristic and ‘abstract’ views of society, isolating its predom-
inant features and attributing them to individuals as their real motives. But if
we derive individual motives (for instance: selfish sentiments) from the features
of the system, without a preliminary study of human nature, the convergence
between individual activities and the dynamics of the system is only an a priori
hypothesis (see: his critique to Hobbes and Mandeville). Of course, Smith main-
tains, we cannot underestimate the role of some motives (selfish sentiments) of
human behavior, which are surely grounded on the “natural effort which every
man is continually making to better his own condition” (Smith 1976 [1776], 2,
IV.9.28, p. 674), but we cannot foresee the way in which they are really per-
formed, in order to attain in every specific situation the purpose of bettering
“his own condition”. In particular, the certainty that it necessarily occurs in the
envisaged forms (because it is desirable or ‘rational’, according to the perspec-
tive of the social analyst) is unrealistic and erroneous from the analytical point
of view.
Anomalous behaviors normally occur in society and the economy. They arise
from individual activities and are rooted in social and economic attitudes, de-
termined by endogenous changes of the environment. So, if in society inap-
propriate behaviors can be caused by the “corruption of moral sentiments”, the
same occurs in the economy, where inappropriate behaviors can be caused not
by the impact of external factors on the market (State, social rules, ethics, etc.),
but just by its ordinary working: “not only the prejudices of the public, but,
what is much more unconquerable, the private interests of many individuals,
irresistibly oppose it” (Smith 1976 [1776], 1, IV.2.43, p. 471). As a consequence
distances can arise between the scientific representation of the world and its
historical evolution and this represents a permanent challenge for the social
sciences (Heilbroner 1982, p. 434 ff.; Winch 1978, p. 167 ff.; Pesciarelli 1988, p.
XL ff.). Of course, Smith admitted, the pride and presumption of the philoso-
pher lead him to consider his scientific representation of the world as the only
possible:
even we, while we have been endeavoring to represent all philosophical systems as mere
inventions of the imagination, to connect together the otherwise disjointed and discor-
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dant phænomena of nature, have insensibly been drawn in, to make use of language
expressing the connecting principles of this one, as if they were the real chains which
Nature makes use of to bind together her several operations. (Smith 1980 [1795], p. 105)
A relativistic attitude, grounded on his peculiar inductive-deductive approach,
pervades the entire work of Adam Smith. Ricardo’s theoretical universe, deduc-
tively built, is different. Ricardo is convinced of the priority of the stability of
his scientific system, in the belief that it perfectly reflects the real world—what
T. Hutchison has defined as “the enormous simplification of the full knowledge
postulate” (Hutchison 1994, p. 196). The concept of “natural order” of his system
is closer to that of Quesnay and French rationalism rather than to that of Adam
Smith and the empirical rationalism represented along the axis Locke-Hume-
Smith (Jonas 1964, p. 53-80). Besides, the explanatory efficacy of his scientific
representation is guaranteed by the postulate of the structural stability of the
economic system. Individual behaviors, in the case of activities not convergent
with the structural rules (‘natural laws’), cannot affect the long-term dynamics
of the system and its rational order. They—like those historical events not fore-
seen by the evolutionary logic of the system—represent a kind of ‘accidental’
or inessential “in the sea of  singular empirical data” (Hegel 1991, p. 31). They
are simply irrelevant for the understanding of social order and its endogenous
necessities.
Economists are exclusively called on to represent the essential structure of
the world. For this reason, Ricardo considers unacceptable taking into account
those “accidental” historical changes that seem to introduce doubts regarding
the scientific representation of the world (De Vecchi 1993, p. 21-24). Think, for
instance, of the Ricardian reflection on economic imbalances or the anoma-
lous aspects of international trade. In the case of economic crises, he criticized
Malthus for focusing on “temporary effects” (Ricardo 1973, 6, p. 133), sacrific-
ing the relationships between the structural variables that emerge in the long
run. In the case of the effects of the international commerce on the dynamics
of economic systems, he again accused Malthus of letting himself be fooled by
superficial and contradictory events, which are more practical in nature than
scientific ones. One must not forget, he stresses, that “that is a question of fact
and not of science.” If we were to give relevance to these facts, we would risk
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compromising the structure of our scientific representation. On the other hand,
he adds, the recourse to the facts might always be used against theories: “might
be urged against almost every proposition in Political Economy” (Ricardo 1973,
6, p. 64).
As is well known, Marx criticized Ricardo on economic crises, on money, on
international trade, on the effects of competition on the economic structure,
for his incapability to consider the role of the middle classes in the distribu-
tion of surplus, etc., denouncing the distance between his scientificrepresenta-
tion and historical reality. Nevertheless, the fascination of Ricardo prevailed in
his judgment, beyond the internal inconsistencies of his analysis, with refer-
ence to two aspects: the supposed certainty about the correspondence between
scientific system and reality, and, above all, because of his belief in the neces-
sary evolution of the economic system, according to its ‘natural laws’. So, the
Ricardian analysis of the ‘anatomy’ of modern social formation pushed Marx
toward a reflection on the economic field as the essential one for the inquiry
into modern society. But as Max Weber pointed out, to have a historically de-
termined system, viable for “constructing relationships winch our imagination
accepts as plausibly motivated”, and, hence, “objectively possible“, according to
our “nomological standpoint” (Weber 1949, p. 92), does not authorize unequivo-
cal and mechanical correspondences between theories and reality, In fact, such
a hypothesis would introduce in the social sciences those “naturalistic preju-
dices”, which on the one hand, would make scientific explanations difficult, and
on the other hand, would give to scientific theories a normative structure (We-
ber 1949, p. 94). Probably, through Ricardo, Marx re-opens the path towards
the recovery of that “powerful tradition of philosophical jusnaturalist teleol-
ogy”, which profoundly characterized the vision of “liberal economists of the
time” (Myrdal 1975, p. 251). So, Marx seems to accept, in some way, that in-
version between individual and society, which he had harshly criticized in his
youthful work. This passage will be decisive for the subsequent evolution of
Marxist thinking, even though Lenin, as a strict reader of Das Kapital, warned
about the risk of this reductionist approach: the analysis of the anatomy of so-
ciety cannot be sufficient for the social analyst, just like the study of human
anatomy cannot exhaust the study of man (cf. Lenin 1977, p. 57-58).
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4. Some developments of Marxist views after Marx: from
the “final economic crisis” to socialism
As is well known, the extraordinary diffusion of socialism in the last quar-
ter of the 19ᵗʰ century was not the effect of direct reading of Das Kapital. But
apart from this, we have to acknowledge—as Vilfredo Pareto pointed out—that
its importance was remarkable in the popular imagination not only because it
seemed to respond to the thirst for social justice, but also because it did that in
a “scientific way”, according with the expectations of the time (Pareto 1987, p.
334 ff.; Pareto 1961, § 1009, p. 401). Not by chance did Marxist scholars empha-
size in Das Kapital this character of a neutral scientific analysis, deriving the
necessity of socialism from it. Within such a discourse, historical materialism
was seen as a general interpretative canon, in many respects comparable with
the positivistic theory of evolution. The recurring focus on the Marxian reflec-
tion about the contradictions between the capitalist mode of production and the
development of the productive forces as a neuralgic and inevitable mechanism
able to assure social change, facilitated the inattention on the complexity of the
historical determinations of capitalist society. As a consequence, the reference
to the centrality of economic factors was conceived as a sort of unquestionable
general explanans of social dynamics, reserving to political strategy an ancil-
lary role. It is amazing that since the 1880s (Marx died in 1883), “the concept
of revolution was simply equated with the collapse of capitalist society” (Stein-
berg 1979, p. 79). Such an approach was favored by the fact that in the work of
Marx there did not exist for political theory “an analogous corpus” compara-
ble with that devoted to economic theory (Hobsbawm 1978, p. 247). Marx and
Engels had generally considered the issues related to the political and institu-
tional evolution of society as “secondary problems” (Hobsbawm 1978, p. 247).
The low importance attributed to political theory inevitably translated into a
3 : 18 Vitantonio Gioia
substantial eclipse of a thorough reflection about the role of subjective factors
in the analysis of capitalism (Bobbio 1976, esp. p. 21-41; Cerroni 1973, esp. p.
84-97; Cerroni 1982, p. 103 ff.).
This theoretical approach, primarily concerned with the analysis of the “anat-
omy” of society, was further amplified by Engels, whoseAnti-Dühring played an
essential role in the international diffusion of Marxism (Stedman Jones 1978, p.
320). The most authoritative members of the Second International (Bebel, Bern-
stein, Kautsky, Plechanov, Aksel’rod, Labriola, etc.) were so influenced by this
book that Kautsky confessed that Anti-Dühring had helped him “to understand
Das Kapital and to read it in a correct way” (Stedman Jones 1978, p. 320, see
also Steinberg 1981, p. 159-174). It is not surprising, then, that they spread the
idea of the “final crisis” of capitalism as an economic event and Kautsky (1881)
wrote: “Our task is not to organize the revolution but to organize ourselves for
the revolution; our task is not to make the revolution, but use it” (Steinberg
1979, p. 79). A view he will confirm ten years later (1891), in his commentary
about the Erfurt Program:
We consider the breakdown of the present social system to be unavoidable, because we
know that economic evolution inevitably brings on the conditions that will compel the
exploited classes to rise against this system of private ownership. (Kautsky 1971, p. 90)
The “final crisis of the capitalist economy” was “justified” with arguments
deriving predominantly from the theory of the lack of proportion (between the
productive sectors), or, to a lesser extent, from the under-consumption theory.
Nevertheless, the theorists of the Second International did not use a pure theory
of the lack of proportions (remembering the outcomes it had given in Tugan-
Baranowsky) and, with the exception of Rosa Luxemburg, they did not even
adopt a pure theory of under-consumption. The Marxian critique of Malthus,
Sismondi and Rodbertus were continuously recalled: under-consumption does
not explain the genesis of economic crises, Engels wrote, even if it is a recurring
phenomenon within them:
The under-consumption of the masses is a necessary condition of all forms of society
based on exploitation, consequently also of the capitalist form; but it is the capitalist
form of production which first gives rise to crises. The under-consumption of the masses
is therefore also a prerequisite condition of crises, and plays in them a role which has
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long been recognised. But it tells us just as little why crises exist today as why they did
not exist before. (CW 25, p. 272)
Within this mechanistic vision of economic (and social) dynamics, the theory
of the anarchy of production seemed to assume a catalytic role, as it could en-
compass a theory of the lack of proportions in which under-consumption was
conceived as a kind of inevitable major disproportion. On the other hand, this
reference to under-consumption and to the lack of effective demand seemed
functional to the explanation of imperialism. Rosa Luxemburg expressed this
connection between under-consumption and imperialism in extreme form in
herTheAccumulation of Capital (1913) (which, not by chance, is subtitled:A con-
tribution to the economic explanation of Imperialism). This approach was largely
shared: think of Kautsky, Bebel and even Lenin (Imperialism, the Highest Stage
of Capitalism, 1917), who in his youthful writings had severely criticized the
analytical relevance of the under-consumption theories (vs Sismondi and his
Russian followers).
The successes of the trade unions (especially in England), the positive elec-
toral results of the Social Democratic Party and the “Bernstein-Debatte”¹ accen-
tuated the reflection on the political strategy of the working class, but in the
circles of Marxist orthodoxy the general approach, centered on the theory of
the economic collapse, was largely confirmed. The relevance of the theory of
the “final crisis of capitalism” continued to be unquestioned but, with reference
to the issue of the transition to socialism, reflections arose whether it should
be the result of a “violent political revolution” or the consequence of reformist
policies. The view of a possible peaceful transition to socialism (Cunow 1970,
p. 424-30) gained a growing weight in the internal debates, both because—as
Conrad Schmidt noted—it would be difficult to realize the radical “socialist re-
forms” on the ruins of the old social order (Schmidt 1970, p. 266), and because
the conviction that a ‘political rupture’ would have preceded the economic col-
lapse of capitalism also gained ground (Engels in CW 25, p. 254 ff.; Hilferding
1910, esp. chap 25; on this, see: Napoleoni 1970, esp. p. XLIV-LXX).
Rosa Luxemburg severely criticized this view. In her opinion, the recurring
¹ The “Bernstein-Debatte” was originated by a series of articles published with great furor between
1896-8 in the socialist journalsNeue Zeit andVorwärts. They constituted the basis for the publication
of Bernstein’s Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie, 1899.
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crises of the capitalist economy constituted only a prerequisite for political rev-
olution: there is undoubtedly a continuous mutual influence between the po-
litical and economic aspects of social becoming, but the determining and deci-
sive factor remains, in the ultimate analysis, the economic one. According to
Luxemburg, while the organization of the economy and its productive systems
“approach more and more the production relations of socialist society”, “its po-
litical and juridical relations established between capital ist society and socialist
society a steadily rising wall”. In this situation, only “the hammer blow of rev-
olution, that is to say, the conquest of politi cal power by the proletariat, can
break down this wall” (Luxemburg 2008, p. 65-66; on this: Cerroni 1973, p. 70-
75). The fact remains, that these discussions were rigidly confined within the
space of economic reflections and the idea of the economic collapse of capital-
ism (Cerroni 1971, p. 17; Perrotta 2018, p. 137-151).
An interested observer, Werner Sombart in his Sozialismus und Soziale Bewe-
gung im 19. Jahrhundert¹, summarizing the essential aspects of those debates,
indicated two main limits: on the one hand, their economicist torsion, on the
other, the lack of rigorous investigations about the role of subjective factors in
social change (Gioia 2015). Sombart did not question the “necessity of social-
ism”, emphasizing the crucial role played by Marxian analysis about the rela-
tionship between material conditions of existence and social change, but he con-
sidered unacceptable the Zusammenbruchstheorie (‘theory of self-destruction’)
and the idea that it could have a central role for the transition to socialism (Som-
bart 1909, p. 86-87). If anything, he continued, contemporary capitalism would
be characterized by recurring “periods of chronic depression” and stagnation.
For this reason, Sombart proposed to correct the famous Marxian expression
that capitalism will dig its tomb in the course of its development. In his opin-
ion, “it would be more correct to say that it was preparing its bed of sickness”
(Sombart 1909, p. 87; on this, see: Priddat 1996, 1, p. 291; Chaloupek 1996, 2, p.
172).
According to him, the main problem of those debates derived from the fact
that they completely neglected the ideal component, which is predominant in
¹ As is well known, this work was the result of a series of eight lectures on socialism held in 1896
by W. Sombart in Switzerland (invited by the Swiss Society for Ethical Culture). They were soon
published in several editions and translated into many languages (Epstein 1909, p. v-vi).
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the construction of a new social system. Social evolution is caused by changes
in historically determined “relationships of powers”. They do not change me-
chanically, on the basis of the dynamics of economic factors, but only if an ideal
propensity towards the change produces an adequate capacity of political con-
trol and a transformation of the political systems addressed to the development
of more democratic institutions, able to modify the cultural contexts and the
motives of human activity (Sombart 1908, p. 60 ff.; 1909, p. 53 ff.; on this see:
Lenger 1996, 2, p. 257-8, Lenger 1997, p. 148 ff.). If we only use leverage on the
economic factors, the reference to the role of the subjective factors (through
“class consciousness”) will only represent an ineffective and ideological surro-
gate. Lukács himself would later admit that the exclusive reference to economic
factors in the view of the transition to socialism had facilitated the adoption of
an idealistic approach with reference to the category of the “class conscious-
ness”: “As to the way in which the problem was actually dealt with, it is not
hard to see today that it was treated in purely Hegelian terms” (Lukács 1972, p.
xxii, see also p. xxvii ff.).
5. A revolution against “Das Kapital”. Antonio Labriola and
Antonio Gramsci: the Italian way toward the rediscovery of
the role of political subjectivity
Gramsci largely developed this issue in his Prison Notebooks, where we find
the attempt to propose a new vision of Marxism, which could overcome the
theoretical limits which had distorted its evolution. Such limits were also traced
back to those naturalistic and positivistic attitudes which had characterized the
thought of K. Marx. Along this pathway Gramsci recovered the scientific con-
tribution of Antonio Labriola (Gramsci 1975, 1, p. 309; 2, 1241ff., 1507 ff.), who
had emphasized the following aspects:
1
the originality of historical materialism and its scientific autonomy with
respect to other philosophical views (idealism, positivism, neo-Kantianism,
old materialism) (Labriola 1968b, p. 18-19, p. 86 ff., Labriola 1968c, p. 188 ff.;
Labriola 1968d, p. 320-340).
2
the need to free Marxism from economism, which had transformed histori-
cal materialism into a general interpretative canon, mechanically applicable
3 : 22 Vitantonio Gioia
to every social situation in order to foresee its evolution, apart from detailed
historical analyses (Labriola 1968a, p. 59-60; Labriola 1968b, p. 76 ff., p. 98 ff.).
3
finally, the emphasis on the role of human subjectivity in social change
(Labriola 1968a, p. 54-56L¸abriola 1968b, p. 83, p. 105-107; Labriola 1968d, p.
336).
Of course, we cannot reconstruct the entire reflection of Gramsci (and Labri-
ola) on this issue, but we can probably give the sense of Gramsci’s approach,
with reference to two articles—TheRevolution againstCapital andUtopia—which
he published in 1917.
In the previous section, we recalled in synthesis what is considered as a com-
mon starting point of Marxist inquiries into contemporary capitalism and the
prevalent view about the transition to socialism. With reference to Marx, Marx-
ist scholars tried to demonstrate that the socialism should have been the result
of the most advanced capitalistic organization of the economy and society. As
is well known, history so far has led to the realization of socialism in coun-
tries which were not capitalistically advanced and which were even difficult to
define as capitalist societies, in a proper sense (young Lenin’s analysis of the
capitalistic nature of Russian society was a successful invention). Anyway, this
view was grounded on a mechanical application of the historical materialist ap-
proach, linking social changes to the evolution of the economic system. Within
it, the role of subjective factors was irrelevant and, in every case, exclusively
determined by economic dynamics (development of productive forces). Accord-
ing to Gramsci, a theoretical revision of the view of historical materialism was
needed and the Russian Revolution seemed to represent an ideal event to begin
with:
1
“The Bolshevik Revolution consists more of ideologies than of events. […]
This is the revolution against Karl Marx’s Capital”. Now, the new events
have overcome the old ideologies: “Events have exploded the critical schemas
determining how the history of Russia would unfold according to the canons
of historical materialism. The Bolsheviks reject Karl Marx, and their explicit ac-
tions and conquests bear witness that the canons of historical materialism are
not so rigid as one might have thought and has been believed” (Gramsci 2000,
p. 33).
2
“if the Bolsheviks reject some of the statements in Capital, they do not reject
its invigorating, immanent thought. These people are not ‘Marxists’, that is
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all; they have not used the works of the Master to compile a rigid doctrine of
dogmatic utterances never to be questioned” (Gramsci 2000, p. 33).
3
“They live Marxist thought […] which represents the continuation of Ger-
man and Italian idealism, and which in the case of Marx was contaminated
by positivist and naturalist incrustations. This thought sees as the dominant fac-
tor in history, not raw economic facts, but man, men in societies, men in relation
to one another, reaching agreements with one another, developing through these
contacts (civilization) a collective, social will; men coming to understand economic
facts, judging them and adapting them to their will until this becomes the driving
force of the economy and moulds objective reality, which lives and moves and
comes to resemble a current of volcanic lava that can be channelled wherever
and in whatever way the will determines” (Gramsci 2000, p. 33, my italics).
4
During the social changes of a country devastated by unspeakable suffering
and miseries, the ideal and voluntaristic component became prevalent: “Me-
chanically at first, then actively and consciously after the first revolution [february
revolution], the people’s will become as one”. (Gramsci 2000, p. 34, my italics).
Antonio Gramsci did not hide the difficulty of a challenge such as that of re-
alizing a socialist society in a country which did not have the necessary level of
economic maturity, but he was convinced that “the revolutionaries themselves
will create the conditions needed for the complete and full achievement of their
goal. And they will create them faster than capitalism could have done” (Gram-
sci 2000, p. 35). Gramsci insists on a issue which will be central in his Prison
Notebooks: as the increase of material wealth depends less on the time of labor
and on the quantity of labor, but more and more on the powerful capability
of men educated in the use of science and technologies, so the development
of a social system depends on the cultural richness of individuals rooted in al-
ways more complex social contexts, oriented by advanced political-institutional
networks. On this basis, it is possible to conceive and plan original processes
aiming for the development of the whole of mankind. Besides, we should know
that such projects of human development need not only the analysis of “raw
economic facts” (the “anatomy” of the society), but especially the inquiry into
the distinctive features of the social systems, their cultural attitudes and their
institutional arrangements:
The truth is that no two political constitutions are the same, just as no two economic
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structures are the same. The truth is that the formula is anything but the arid expression
of a glaringly obvious natural law. Between the premises (economic structure) and the
consequence (political constitution) the relations are anything but simple and direct; and
the history of a people is not documented by economic facts alone. The unraveling of the
causation is a complex and involved process. To disentangle it requires nothing short of
a profound and wide-ranging study of every intellectual and practical activity. (Gramsci
2000, p. 45, on this, see also: Gramsci 1970, I, p. 462-465)
The emphasis on that “profound and wide-ranging study of every intellec-
tual and practical activity” is important in order to highlight the link between
the development of subjectivity and the political-institutional context, avoiding
those unacceptable simplifications which had exclusively insisted on the eco-
nomic aspects of social dynamics, neglecting the relevance of the modern state
and the cultural phenomena of a civilized country. On this aspect, as Umberto
Cerroni pointed out, if Lenin was the heretic Marxist who realized the revo-
lution against Marx’s Capital, Gramsci can be considered the Leninist heretic,
who, through such an approach, imagined the social transformation against
Lenin, who—as the author of State and Revolution—pictured a simplified and
unacceptable representation of the modern state, with reference to the way in
which the institutional arrangements can hinder or promote the development
of the individuals (Cerroni 1978, p. 49).
Nevertheless, it is useful to remember that Lenin himself reflecting later on
this issue reached the same conclusions and criticized the serious limits of his
analysis in State and Revolution. In fact, in 1923 (a few months before his death)
he proposed (Better Fewer, but Better) a double self-critical judgment about his
previous analyses: he criticized again the economistic interpretation of social
changes and, at the same time, acknowledged that his view about the role of the
modern state was inadequate. As far as the first aspect is concerned, he writes:
we started not from where we had to start according to the theory (of all kinds of pedants)
and in our country the political and social revolutions preceded the cultural revolution
[…] Now, we have to do this cultural revolution in order to become a completely socialist
country; But for us this cultural revolution implies incredible difficulties, both of a purely
cultural nature (since we are illiterate), and of a material nature (since, in order to become
educated men, a certain development of the material means of production is necessary).
(Lenin 1977, p. 839-840)
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As for the second aspect, he emphasized the need to inquire in a more pro-
found way into the role of the modern institutional systems within a Marxist
perspective, because the “proletarian state” is in a “deplorable” situation, and
the task of improving the “state apparatus” “is very difficult and it is far from
being solved, and is an extremely urgent one”:
Either we prove now that we have really learned something about state organization (we
ought to have learned something in five years), or we prove that we are not sufficiently
mature for it. If the latter is the case, we had better not tackle the task. (Lenin 1977, p.847
ff.)
On this aspect, Lenin wrote, that the Russians had to learn from the more
advanced capitalist countries. Such as Germany and England: “in order to ren-
ovate our state apparatus” and as the representatives of proletarian culture “we
must at all costs set out, first, to learn, secondly, to learn, and thirdly, to learn…”
(Lenin 1977, p. 848, see also p. 852).
As we can see, this view represented the distinctive aspects of the Grams-
cian research project of 1917: the development of human subjectivity depends
not only on economic growth and the scientific development it promotes, but
also on the institutional arrangements and the symbolic forms guaranteeing
processes of socialization. The features of the individuals, determined by con-
tinuous interactions with social environment, are central to promoting social
change. In fact, their motives are intertwined with the more complex struc-
ture of needs (starting from the exigency of social justice and human equality),
which invert individual behavior from a merely adaptive attitude to a creative
one. Only on this basis, do we have the possibility of overcoming the ideological
bonds of capitalist society, which consider the “economic structure and its exi-
gencies” in a theological way, as supra-human forces driving men’s lives. Men
can, then, re-appropriate their destiny: “man can dominate his own destiny, he
can do it himself, creating his life (on this: Labriola 1968b, p. 142).
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6. Conclusions
Some years ago, Norman Geras in his Marx and Human Nature: Refutation of
a Legend gave us a synthetic view of scholars (as Louis Althusser, Tom Botto-
more, Robert D. Cumming, Eugene Kamenka, Vernon Venable, Robert Tucker,
Kate Soper, Colin Summer, Sidney Hook, etc.), who refuted Marx’s analysis on
human nature, trying to build, as Althusser pointed out, a “theoretical anti-
humanism” (Althusser 1969, p. 219 ff.; on this, see Geras 1983, p. 49-50; Gold-
mann 1969, p. 166 ff.). The young Marx’s analysis on individuals and human
nature was considered a sort of residue of a philosophical tradition which was
inappropriate for social analysis. In this short conclusion, I will try to show that
the recovery of Marx’s reflection has neither an archeological purpose nor that
of solving some interpretative aspects within the limited field of Marxist schol-
ars. In my opinion, the recovery of this Marxian issue can have significant ef-
fects for contemporary social sciences, opening analytical perspectives devoted
to a better integration between the historical characteristics of social systems
and the features of individuals. From this point of view, I find difficult to un-
derstand the reasons for the anti-humanistic attitude which has characterized
some interpretations of Marx’s thought: I cannot see the advantages it should
offer for the analysis of the economy and society. A humanistic viewpoint does
not bring to diminish the relevant Marxian contribution to the analysis of the
capitalistic economy or to underrate the role of the economy in modern society.
On the contrary, it lays at the core of Marxian analyses aimed at discovering
the human roots of every social fact, escaping the theological trap which sees
facts or things as dominating human life (e.g. the ‘fetishism of commodities’).
Without this humanistic attitude, Marxian analyses would be close to those
of liberal and neo-liberal economics, which inverts the relation between the
purposes of the economy and the purposes of men, in the conviction that, in the
long run, they can coincide (on this, see Heilbroner 1986, p. 163, 170). Besides,
this cannot but create a de-historicized view of individualism and a distorted
idea about the relationships between individual and society. The former and the
latter become the terms of an unresolvable antinomy: on one side, we find an
isolated and impotent Self (with a given structure of needs and a tightly limited
range of possible choices within the ‘capitalist rules of action’); on the other
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side, we find the omnipotent society, determined by the fatalistic character of
its natural laws (Plekhanov 1960, p. 56).
Now, if we take a rapid glance at many contemporary analyses of individ-
ualism or to the reflections on the relationships between individuals and soci-
ety, we find an impressive and recurring dissatisfaction among social analysts.
As far as the first aspect is concerned, Weber emphasized the difficulty of a
univocal definition of “the term ‘individualism’”, which “embraces the utmost
heterogeneity of meanings” (Weber 1988, p. 208). Dewey harshly criticized the
“perversion of the whole ideal of individualism” (Dewey 1999, p. 9, see also p.
51 ff.), pushing for a new model of individualism. Hayek was profoundly dis-
appointed by the reflections concerning individualism, especially considering
its centrality for social sciences: it has been “abused and […] misunderstood” in
its meaning and “distorted […] into an unrecognizable caricature” by its critics
and its followers (Hayek 1958, p. 2). More recently, Charles Taylor has observed
“how shallow and partial are the one-sided judgments” we use with reference
to the features of “modern individualism” (Taylor 1989, p. X) and Lukes has
emphasized the difficulty of disentangling the “rich semantic history” of indi-
vidualism (Lukes 1971, p. 45). The idea that the “individual person may be seen
as—or actually is—a set of sub-individuals, relatively autonomous ‘selves’” does
not seem a practicable solution (Elster 1985, p. 1), because it determines an in-
crease of the problems to face. So—as Elliot and Lemert pointed out—the inquiry
of the complexity of the “many selves”, risks rendering more problematic the
possibility of a univocal meaning of the modern individual and his relationship
with society (Elliot and Lemert 2009, esp. p. xi-xxvii).
Besides, and here we get at the second aspect, beyond the repetitive insistence
of economists on the homo œconomicus approach (Hutchison 1994, p. 189-90;
McCloskey 1991, p. 6-16; Davis 2003, esp. 81 ff.), many sociologists also adopt a
similar view, starting from an atomistic vision of social life, centered on rational
agents that move in contexts without institutions and historically relevant vari-
ables (Hodgson 2001, p. 14 ff.). The starting point is normally characterized by a
definition of the individual obtained by isolating a supposed prevalent motive
in his behavior, aiming to transform it into a universal feature of modern in-
dividualism. It is an old approach that Adam Smith had already criticized with
reference to those ”splenetic philosophers”, like Mandeville or Hobbes, who—
“in judging of human nature” (Smith 2004 [1790], 3.ii.27, p. 148)—would isolate
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individuals, considering exclusively their natural endowments and the desire to
pursue only their own private good. This approach, on the one hand, does not
explain sociability, because it cannot reconstruct the meaning of human inter-
actions and lacks the understanding of the complex array of human passions
at the base of human behavior; on the other hand, it presupposes—as given
and unchangeable—the social organization that it claims to explain (Smith 2004
[1790], 7.ii.6-14, p. 363-370; on this, see Hodgson 2001, p. 14 ff. and p. 273 ff.;
Raffaeli 1996, p. 5-34; Gioia 2019).
In the same way, some analysts of modern individualism consider the indi-
vidual as a hedonist, narcissist, consumerist, a man without quality, by isolating
features that appear on the surface of the individuals behavior in this historical
phase. Once again, as the young Marx would have said, social analysts revert
the relationships between society and individuals, univocally and uncritically
attributing to the individual in general the features prevalent in contemporary
society. On the other hand, the inquiry into the features of contemporary soci-
ety, in order to focus on the historical determinants of individualism, is consid-
ered too problematic because of its exposure to the adoption of ad hoc assump-
tions that move away social science from that model of “parsimonious expla-
nations” that social scientists prefer, following the explicative models typical of
physics. However, Jon Elster has to admit (reluctantly), social science is more
close to a “social chemistry” than to a social physics: “the time for social physics
is not yet here, and may never come” (Elster 1995, p. 1, see also p. 248 ff.; on
this, see: Giddens 1982, p. 527-539).
What is interesting is the fact that this approach was anticipated by the anal-
yses of two scholars, Weber and Werner Sombart, who, through a rich and
engaging confrontation with Marx, tried to build a theoretical alternative to
him, emphasizing the role of the subjective factors in economy and society. As
is well known Weber and Sombart appreciated Marxian historical materialism,
emphasizing its originality and its usefulness for economic and social analy-
sis. Nevertheless, they criticized the uncritical attitude of Marxist scholars, who
transformed it into “a universal canon” with a ‘naturalistic’ basis, hypothesizing
a necessary evolution of society (Weber 1949, p. 69-70, Weber 1992 [1904-05], p.
21 ff.). But “absolute necessities” do not exist in history, because economic and
social phenomena are determined “in the ultimate analysis, by the psyche of
the individuals” (Sombart 1894, p. 592; Sombart 1908, p. 11 ff.; on this: Pearsons
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2002, p. 35; Lenger 1997, p. 151-3). The category of the “spirit of capitalism” was
intended as a way of recovering the role of subjective factors (cultural, ethic,
political, religious in nature) in order to understand the changes in the econ-
omy and society, As is well known, they used this category for explaining the
genesis and development of “modern capitalism” (Gioia 2013, 2015).
Nevertheless, when they analyzed the individual-economy relationship with
reference to advanced capitalism their views radically changed. In their opin-
ion, the bureaucratic and technological dimension of contemporary society and
its internal and inescapable rationality have destroyed the distinctive features
of the social systems (capitalism and socialism are the same): individuals dis-
cover themselves as passive elements in an enormous mechanism. They are
considered as “fragments” of an “unalterable order of things”, without any real
autonomy. Weber’s “iron cage” and Sombart’s “economic machine” represent
an unchangeable world. Individual and rational behavior, have to move within
the “capitalistic rules of action”. Adaptive behavior is the only way in which
individuals can survive. The creative and innovative human who built ‘modern
capitalism’ is considered a fact of the past:
The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the indi-
vidual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an unalterable
order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved
in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action… (Weber
1992 [1904-05], p. 20)
The same conclusions we find in Sombart: capitalism, radically changing the
‘natural orientation’ of the old economic organizations, has destroyed every
communitarian value, modifying even human nature. A ‘new mankind’ arose,
the features of the individuals (entrepreneurs and workers) being strictly deter-
mined by the logic of the system:
Capitalism needed a new race of men in order to reach its ends. Men able to insert
themselves in a big system, a capitalist firm […] those marvelous feats of relations of
superiority, subordination, and coordination, those skilful pictures composed of par-
tial men (Teilmenschen). The new economic structure required these human segments:
beings without soul, depersonalized, dispirited beings, capable to be components, or bet-
ter: little cogwheels in an intricate mechanism. (Sombart 1927, 1, p. 424; my transl. from
German)
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And, as he wrote in his Der Bourgeois, this is an inescapable social reality:
Some people indeed expected to overcome [the giant Capitalism] by appealing to ethical
principles; I, for my part, can see that such attempts are doomed to utter failure. When we
remember that capitalism has snapped the iron chains of the oldest religions, it seems to
me hardly likely that it will allow itself to be bound by the silken threads of the wisdom
that hails from Weimar and Kőnisgsberg. (Sombart 1967 [1913], p. 357-58)
It is really amazing that strict interpreters of Marx’s thought, as Max We-
ber and Sombart were, have reproduced in their analyses those epistemological
distortions that Marx had radically criticized with reference to Hegel, Stirner,
Feuerbach, and others. Of course, they ignored the work of the young Marx,
but the fact remains: if their critiques of Marxist determinism seemed to re-
cover the scientific perspectives of the young Marx, their analyses of late cap-
italism re-proposed that naturalistic determinism which they had denounced
with reference to Marxism. Probably, their analyses would have had a different
outcome if the structure of human needs was not only defined within the cir-
cular relationships between historical characteristics of society and motives of
the individuals, building an unchangeable identity between human needs and
exigencies of the economic system. The reference to that propensities of the
nature of man that Marx inquired (“natural forces, vital forces” “as dispositions
and faculties”, as “natural impulses”) would have allowed a better understand-
ing of the present in a historical perspective. Not by chance, as Wallerstein
pointed out, “the prevalent opinion in politics and mainstream social sciences
has been that no major structural change is even worth thinking about”, follow-
ing in such a conviction the approach of neoclassical economics, which “bases
its model on the assumption of a fundamentally unchanging social universe”
(Wallerstein 2013, p. 5).
In my opinion, it is still a rich field of enquiry within which the approach of
the young Marx and his radical humanism (“To be radical is to grasp the root of
the matter. But for man the root is man himself”, CW 3, p. 182) will have great
relevance. Thus, whether Max Weber is right calling for ‘historically-oriented
analyses’ concerning the features of modern individualism and the scientific
explanations of individual behaviors, it is useful to not neglect the relationships
between habits, culture, social rules and human nature:
Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities turns, they are agen-
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cies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing their quality. Con-
sequently, whenever we are concerned with understanding social transition and flux or
with projects for reform, personal and collective, our study must go to the analysis of
native tendencies. (Dewey 1922, p. 93)
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